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Structure of the Report

The report begins by summarizing the political context and relevant facts regarding the Rio Negro massacres. Key points from this section include:

* The Chixoy Dam and the Rio Negro Community. Regarding the relationship between the Chixoy dam and the Rio Negro community, two pieces of evidence stand out:

1. the timing of the massacres, and
2. the stark change in well-being after the community's displacement.

Human rights organizations argue that the Rio Negro massacres were a direct result of the community's resistance to their expected displacement. The government identified the Rio Negro community as part of the guerilla resistance, despite their denials, because of their resistance to relocation. Thus it has been argued that the dam, and the community's refusal to be relocated, provoked genocidal violence.

Furthermore, the massacres at Agua Fria, Los Encuentros and Xococ occurred because of the presence of Rio Negro villagers displaced in those communities.

Today, members of the Rio Negro community live in extreme poverty in comparison to neighboring communities. However, before dam construction, the community enjoyed, relatively speaking, a high standard of living.

* Genocide. According to the UN-sponsored Commission for Historical Clarification, of the 24 Mayan ethnic groups in Guatemala, 5 groups, in 4 particular regions, faced genocide during the country's civil war. One of these targeted groups was the Maya-Achi living in the area surrounding Rabinal in Baja Verapaz, which includes the Rio Negro community.

* Lack of Accountability. While the Guatemalan government and military continue to enjoy a significant level of immunity, the World Bank (and IDB) possesses an even greater level of freedom from accountability. Although the World Bank conducted its own internal investigation of this issue, no formal outside investigation has occurred.

Meanwhile, the Bank continues to provide funding to extremely precarious borrowers throughout the world and even in Guatemala. For example is its financial support for the National Fund for Peace (FONAPAZ), a Guatemalan government agency established in 1996 for resettlement purposes, and the Social Investment Fund (FIS) which the World Bank set up in 1993 to help alleviate poverty.

However, statements by the directors of these two groups have suggested that funding will also be used to build "Peace and Development Committees" which have ostensibly been re-forming ex-paramilitary Civil Defense Patrols which committed gross human rights abuses during the civil conflict. As well, a recent investigation found that FONAPAZ spent $4.4 million in remodeling a recreation center, Campo de Marte.

Legal Accountability

The report continues by summarizing the positions of various actors with respect to legal and general lines of reasoning regarding accountability for the human rights violations. The five main issues raised are:

* Knowledge of the abuses. While the World Bank argues that it had no knowledge of the massacres occurring at the time of dam construction, other evidence suggests that World Bank officials either knew or had reason to know about the violence.

* Complicity, negligence, and general responsibility. No group asserts that the World Bank and IDB intentionally aided the Guatemalan military in committing genocide. However, much evidence suggests that the Bank may have irresponsibly supervised the loan for the dam, failing to adequately oversee the project to ensure that human rights violations were not occurring. Such acts could constitute negligence. Complicity with genocide by the military forces of Guatemala can only be explored with further investigation into what the World Bank and IDB knew or had reason to know.

* The World Bank's "non-political" status. World Bank officials refer to Article IV, section 10 of their Charter to claim that they can only look at poverty alleviation issues (and not human rights concerns) when approving a loan. Other legal experts argue, however, that this clause is meant only to prevent World Bank interference in internal political affairs of beneficiary countries; it does not prevent Bank officials from incorporating human rights concerns into loan-decision criteria.

* The relationship between the World Bank and the United Nations. As a specialized agency, the World Bank may be legally bound to uphold the principles of the UN Charter, including articles that ensure the universal protection of human rights.

* The World Bank's legal immunity. Although article VII of the World Bank charter claims legal immunity for the institution and its employees, recent legal precedents suggest that international law (which prohibits human rights violations such as genocide) takes precedence over these immunities.

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